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Unmaking responsibility: patient death and face transplantation 
 
Studies of responsibility are increasingly common in anthropology and the social 
sciences. The concept of responsibilization has proved influential to this corpus of 
scholarship. Recently there have been a number of calls to move beyond such 
intellectual engagement with responsibility, which focuses on the devolution of 
responsibilities from the apparatus of state government to individuals. According to 
approaches that demonstrate “competing responsibilities” (Trnka and Trundle 2014) 
and “structures of responsibility” (Ferguson 2012) this literature risks obfuscating 
corollary modes of doing and distributing responsibility in the contemporary. 
Building on this literature, I present an analysis of patient death in face transplantation 
to argue that we need to pay attention to how responsibility is “unmade”. In doing so, 
I argue for a new mode of studying responsibility that pays attention to when 
questions of responsibility are discursively unmade and ultimately obscured. 
 
Social science engagements with responsibility have demonstrated how the call to be 
responsible and the devolution of responsibility from state government has penetrated 
the realm of biopolitics, resulting in new forms of individuality (Adam 2005; Martin 
2009; Novas and Rose 2000), community (Epstein 1998; Rabeharisoa and Callon 
2002), and citizenship relations (Jasanoff 2012; Petryna 2002; Rose and Novas 2005; 
Rapp, Heath and Taussig 2008). Others have moved beyond analysis of the public 
realm to examine responsibility as a productive force in the shaping of relations 
between kin (Gibbon 2007) and engaged in their own conceptual dissection of the 
notion of responsibly by exploring obligation in relation to the notion of care (Mol 
2008). My analysis pays attention to the consequences of such dissection when it 
occurs outside of the conceptual realm of scholarship concerned with articulating how 
notions of autonomy and choice pervade the public and private realm. 
 
Studies of responsibilization emphasize a trend within advanced liberal democracies 
that has seen individuals increasingly become responsible for what previously, and 
unquestionably, were duties of the state. As Nikolas Rose (2007:3) writes, this is a 
shift that has “involved a reorganization of the powers of the state, with the 
devolution of many responsibilities for the management of human health and 
reproduction that, across the twentieth century, had been the responsibility of the 
formal apparatus of government.” Rose (2014) himself is one of a number of authors 
that have raised concerns about the focus of this shift within the social sciences. These 
authors question the focus on responsibilization as the preeminent mode of 
understanding responsibility, asking us to consider it “alongside relations of care and 
social contract ideologies” and to understand these “three modes of inter-
relationship… as underlying the ‘competing responsibilities’ inherent in 
contemporary social life” (Trnka and Trundle 2014: 1).  
 
But what about when responsibility is seemingly absent? In my study of face 
transplantation I have been forced to consider instances where responsibility would 
otherwise be but is not discussed, and what is spoken about in its place. These are 
instances of potentially preventable patient death in biomedical practice. Through this 
consideration, I have come to understand responsibility as a product forged at the 
meeting of diverse social and techno-scientific components, and as something that is 
open to being remade and unmade. When surgeons discuss patient death in medical 
publications they do so in a way that discursively shifts responsibility for fatality 
away from the operation – that is, from the face transplant the patient received – and 
moves it into a space outside immediate biomedical agency.  
 
Importantly, this discursive play entails a separation of what Paul Ricoeur (2003) 
identifies as the two components of “responsibility” – imputation (causes and 
consequences) and accountability (affect and understanding). This separation is 
central to the mode of unmaking responsibility that I describe; the broad consequence 
of this unmaking is akin to what anthropologist James Fergusson (1990) has called 
“anti-politics” in that it pre-emptively closes down debate about inherently political 
questions. In this example, the question is: Who and / or what is responsible for 
patient death? In Ricoeur’s (2003) semantic analysis of responsibility, he shows that 
the term emerged in the 19th Century as an attempt to synthesize analytic problems 
surrounding the separation of imputation and accountability. The result was (1) a 
coupling of juridical and moral understandings and (2) the related belief that 
individual’s are not only responsible for there own actions, but also for other people 
and for valuable objects. “The displacement then becomes a reversal: one becomes 
responsible for harm because, first of all, one is responsible for others” (Ricoeur 
2000: 29). In reports on patient death in face transplantation, cause and consequences 
are separated from (human) accountability. Instead of asking: Who and / or what is 
responsible for patient death? reports focus on cause of death in a manner all but 
divorced from questions of accountability.  
 
This results in situation where no one is responsible for harm, for the wellbeing of the 
other, because responsibility itself is discursively destroyed in and through biomedical 
speech acts and the ensemble of components that is face transplantation. This 
observation echoes previous accounts of the importance of “strategic ignorance” 
(McGoey 2012) and “knowing not to know” (Giessler 2013) in biomedical contexts 
(see also Taussig 1999). These accounts detail the mobilization of unknowns as a 
method for producing authority and commanding resources in the face of unsettling 
information that could stymie scientific progress or result in liability or guilt in the 
aftermath of deleterious biomedical events. While sharing a concern with the 
reproduction of legitimacy in the face of medical and scientific controversy, my 
analysis focuses on the character and value of the knowledge that is made following 
adverse events, that is, on “knowing how to know”. Thus, while McGoey (2012: 570) 
emphasizes “the deliberate effort to preclude, obfuscate or deflect knowledge from 
emerging” as central to institutional efficiency and the denial of liability, for example, 
I am interested in how epistemic practices discursively recalibrate the relations 
between human and non-human actors in order to enable a desired future. In the case 
at hand, this recalibration takes the form of boundary work that limits what is and is 
not “face transplantation” and the future is that of the nascent biomedical field.  
 
Mode of Analysis 
 
I analyze reports and discussions of patient death as part of my research on the field 
(author 2013, 2014a, 2014b) in which I articulate how the face transplant apparatus 
has remade not only the lives of patients but also the very ways in which state 
institutions, surgeons, and families make sense of rights, claims for inclusion, and life 
itself in the contemporary world. This research is based on interviews with 
reconstructive surgeons, and analysis of policy documents and popular and academic 
texts, in which I trace the emergence of the face transplant apparatus. Following 
Michel Foucault (1980: 194-195), I understand an apparatus to be: 
 
[A] thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions–in 
short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. 
The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between 
these elements. 
 
It is attention to “the said as much as the unsaid” surrounding patient death in face 
transplantation that underlies my mode of analysis and it is this which drew my 
attention toward the uncoupling of imputation and accountability in face 
transplantation.  
 
I locate reports of patient death vis-à-vis the delineation of a form of life worth living 
within the face transplant apparatus. In doing so, I show how concerns with the 
possibility of patient death played a central role in the assemblage of elements that 
now make up the field – patient selection guidelines, modes of informed consent, 
bioethical reasoning, immunological drugs, the concept of “quality of life,” 
technological limitations, statements on the importance of the face for human social 
and biological wellbeing, transplant organizations. To demonstrate how this apparatus 
works, I present a genealogy of face transplantation, from initial debates surrounding 
the operation, which focused on patient death, to (reports on) the current state of the 
field, and related explanations for patient death. This includes a discussion of the 
“boundary work” (Gieryn 1999) and acts of “purification” (Latour 1993) that 
discursively atomizes the ensemble of elements that is face transplant. 
 
The Face Transplant Apparatus 
 
One of the core reasons I became interested in reports of patient death in the field is 
because the topic was so heavily debated in the years leading up to the performance of 
the first face transplant in 2005. The possibility of patient death stagnated the field 
and surrounding debate ultimately shaped the very logics that operate within it and the 
corollary collection of elements that is, now, face transplantation. Underlying this 
debate was the concern that face transplantation risks killing patients (my words) who 
don’t have life threatening conditions in order to improve their quality of life. These 
patients are people with severe facial deformities caused through trauma or illness. 
The primary cause of this risk, according to experts in the field, are the side-effects of 
the immunological drugs required to counter the biological response of the patient’s 
body to the transplanted face. These potentially fatal effects emerge from the patient’s 
compromised immune system, and include increased possibility of cancer and 
systemic infection post transplant. 
 
It is generally agreed that transplanting a composite of bone, skin, and corollary 
biological material from a brain dead donor to a patient with a severe facial condition 
can result in surgical outcomes far superior to traditional reconstructive procedures. 
Everyday reconstructive surgeons move bone, cartilage, skin, and other grafted tissue 
around the bodies of individual patients. This autotransplantation is a key method of 
reshaping the deformed or disfigured patients they treat. However, this mode of 
surgical reconstruction often results in outcomes that disappoint patients and 
practitioners alike. By allowing reconstructive surgeons the possibility to truly follow 
the famous tenant of their sub-specialty – “to replace like with like” – face 
transplantation offers the possibility to produce surgical results that better mimic the 
“normal” functional body: eating, speaking, breathing and feeling socially 
comfortable.  
 
However, critics argued (as they still do) that the potentially fatal consequences of 
face transplantation, a medical procedure that aims to offer patients with a “non-life 
threatening” condition an improved quality of life, means that it contravenes the 
Hippocratic oath to “first, do no harm” and goes against the principles of bioethics. 
Bioethical reasoning dictates that the benefits of any medical procedure must 
outweigh the risks. In the early days of face transplantation, in the years before the 
performance of the first procedure in 2005, the jury was out as to both the risks and 
the benefits of such a transplant: Is the geneticity of the skin, and thus the likelihood 
of biological rejection higher for the face than in solid organ transplantation? What 
about the side effects of immunosuppressant drugs; would more be needed in the case 
of face transplantation? What are the risks and benefits of living with someone else’s 
facial tissue in place of your own? Proponents of the operation could not and did not 
answer these questions as a mode for gaining institutional consent to perform the 
procedure. Instead, they argued that careful patient selection could pull the risks and 
benefits of face transplantation in favor of its performance. 
  
The technical limitations facing surgeons (the dependence on immunosuppressant 
therapy) together with the bureaucratic constraints (bioethics) resulted in the 
delineated a new kind of patient subject: the ideal patient of face transplantation 
(Author 2014a). Face transplant teams in Europe and the America’s successfully 
argued that by selecting a patient whose particular state of health and suffering is so 
that they require the procedure while being healthy enough to withstand the biological 
and psychological effects of the transplanted facial tissue, minimized the risks and 
increase the benefits of the procedure, aligning it with bioethical and Hippocratic 
reason. In other words, face transplantation came to depend on finding patients that 
exhibit certain qualities, whose health exists in a certain balance between normal and 
pathological: it is in this balance that patients become operable and the procedure 
ethical – they conform to the very guidelines and arguments that produced them in 
light of current technological possibilities and limitations (Author 2014b). And it is 
this balancing of health and illness that ultimately allowed the first operation to take 
place. 
The famous, or, depending on whom you ask, infamous first face transplant operation 
was performed in Amiens, France in 2005. The infamy of the operation relates to 
patient selection. For many in the medical world, the world’s first face transplant 
patient, Isabelle Dinoire, was anything but an ideal candidate. A chain smoker whose 
face was gnawed off by her dog while she law unconscious following an overdose on 
sleeping pills, Ms Dinoire’s particular state of health of suffering allowed local and 
international critics to raise numerous questions surrounding the motivations of the 
acting doctors and the ethicality of the procedure (see author 2013). It was not a 
smooth first act in what was already a story with a long and provocative prelude. 
Though, despite her ongoing immunological and psychological difficulties, eventually 
the debate surrounding Ms Dinoire’s discussion died down. 
At present, there have been multiple attempts to provide a thorough overview of the 
state of the field. Yet, as bioethicist Karen Mashke (2007) and I (2014a) have both 
argued, methods for answering fundamental questions such as what constitutes 
“success” are yet to be produced. At the time of writing (November 2014), a total of 
twenty-nine face transplant operations have been performed in a collection of 
countries including France, the USA, Spain, Turkey, and China. Following updates to 
Federal Health policy, the operation is now governed by national transplant agencies 
in the USA, which are currently producing a nation-wide database that will be used to 
assess the field. Below I examine existing reports of the field, paying particular 
attention to how patient death is discussed. At the time of writing, four patients have 
died after receiving a face transplant out of the twenty-nine patients that have 
undergone the procedure. 
 
Patient Death 
 
Following the operation on Isabelle Dinoire in France, a team of Chinese surgeons 
used transplanted facial tissue to reconstruct the face of Li Guoxing, a thirty year-old 
man who was disfigured in a beer attack. His surgeon’s offered the following 
comments on his death: “His death was not caused by the surgery. Our operation was 
a success” before continuing “But we cannot rule out a connection with the immune 
system drugs” (Lite 2008). In this instance, face transplantation is presented as a 
singular event; it is limited to the movement of the graft from the donor to the 
recipient, and the biological acceptance of the graft; it is not presented as (a network) 
composed of human and non-human actors – bacteria, infection, immunological 
drugs, medical experts – that requires ongoing management in order to preserve the 
health of the patient and the graft. 
 
A more complex account was presented in a review of the field that appeared in 2009. 
In this description the cause of death is patient non-compliance, a non-compliance 
that is mediated by a non-medical sociocultural system: 
 
Although the details have not yet been published, this patient died during his 
third-year post transplant. The patient became noncompliant with his 
immunosuppressive regimen possibly at the advice of a “witch doctor” 
(nonmedical tribe doctor) and had a very limited social support system in 
place. He resided in a remote village at a far distance from the hospital. 
(Gordon et al 2009: 573 emphasis added) 
 
In both of these accounts the cause of patient death is not “the surgery.” A boundary 
is discursively drawn around what counts as death by face transplant. The notion of 
boundary work was developed by sociologist Thomas Gieryn (1983: 782, 1999) to 
describe the “attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science (ie to 
its practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, values and work organization) for 
purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual 
activities as ‘non-science’.” In the case at hand, the demarcation drawn is between 
what is and is not “face transplantation.” This discursive work is accompanied by an 
epistemic murkiness surrounding exactly what caused Li Guoxing’s non-compliance 
– was it (the unbearable side effects of the) drugs, his own inability to withstand the 
discomfort they caused, or the “nonmedical tribe doctor”. 
 
In this instance, as in the below examples of discourse surrounding patient death, the 
issue of responsibility does not appear. Better put, it is disappeared, is unmade 
through the very biomedical presentation of cause of death and delimiting of what is 
the face transplant. This delimiting involves the distribution of cause and 
consequences into the network of (non-human) actants and practices that compose the 
face transplant apparatus. This produces a demarcation between human and non-
human causes, which sharpens the divide between what is and is not the face 
transplant. In the second case of patient death in the field, the cause was reported as 
“comorbidity” or the patient’s related health problems. This was a French patient that 
died from cardiac arrest after receiving a concomitant hand and face transplant. His 
surgeons summarized his case as follows:  
 
On day 33, following surgical excision of infected transplanted tissues, the 
patient suffered anoxic cardiac arrest resulting from tracheotomy obstruction 
while being taken from the post operative care unit to the operating room for 
treatment of massive hemorrhage (septic rupture on a radial bypass). After 5 
weeks of intensive care, severe anoxic cerebral lesions revealed by MRI, 
despite no criteria for brain death, were judged irreversible and led to death on 
day 65. The left hand had been amputated previously, and the upper part of the 
facial transplant removed because of its total destruction by the infection. 
(Lantieri et al 2011:372) 
In this example, the patient’s death is located in an ensemble of medical procedures 
(tracheotomy), body conditions (inflammation), and the high-tech medical 
environment where he is located (the intensive care unit).i While there is a partial link 
to the face transplant procedure, the cause of death is attributed to infection rather 
than “face transplantation” (see also Khalifian et al 2014).  
 
Similar, the most recent summary of the field tells us that it was not the face 
transplantation, which included replacing the tongue and jaw, that resulted in the 
death of Spaniard “Francisco M.G.” but his “underlying medical conditions”: “The 
third confirmed death after face transplantation was the result of tumor recurrence in 
an HIV-positive patient who had previously undergone cancer resection” (Khalifan et 
al 2014: 3). In this case, the cause of patient death is moved away from the operation 
an into the (natural) body of the individual – not discussed is the possibility that the 
tumor recurrence resulted from the patient’s artificially lowered immune system, that 
is the immunological therapy used to manage biological rejection of the transplanted 
face. And the cause of the most recent death is even murkier than the previous. The 
only mention of the case that I could find in a medical journal reads: “The last 
reported death was a Turkish patient who died one year post-operative due to organ 
failure necessitating removal of the transplanted face” (Roche et al 2015: 100). 
 
At play here is not only a form of discursive boundary work that delimits face 
transplantation to an operative event. These deaths are situated within a broader 
apparatus that has produced particular forms of “human targets” – patients whose 
health and wellbeing allows face transplants to take place as ethical procedures. This 
ethicality is dependent upon affording the life of patients with severe facial 
deformities a kind of “negative value”: The message is that restoring the anatomy of 
these persons with a face transplant is so important that it is worth risking death to 
achieve it, worth sacrificing a life lived with their “abnormal” face. This status of the 
face transplant patient as a “sacrificial subject” is implicit in and central to the field. 
At stake in patient death is the notion of a life worth living that was formed through 
the assemblage of rationalities, bureaucracies, and technologies that is now face 
transplantation. Embedded within this notion in an implicit coupling of a good life 
and broader ideas of sociotechnical progress, which underlie the transplant apparatus 
in contexts such as the USA (Sharp 2013): Technomedicine is imagined as central to 
societal flourishing. The limitations of technology risk being exposed if the transplant 
is rendered a failure and the ramifications of this arguably extend beyond the medical 
field under analysis because it allows the question to be raised: Is a technomedically-
mediated life, with its associated risks, worth living? This question is silenced when 
death is associated with non-human actants. Meanwhile, patient selection continues to 
be presented as a panacea to the risks inherent in to face transplantation: the “patient 
deaths that have occurred reinforce the importance of patient selection for potential 
non-compliance and underlying medical comorbidities” (Khalifan et al 2014: 3). 
Who, then, is responsible for patient death in the above examples? 
 
Discussion 
 
The answer is that no one is responsible. If responsibilization refers to the devolution 
of responsibility from the nation-state then “unmaking responsibility” indicates the 
dissolving of responsibility itself. In his genealogy of the term, Paul Ricour (2003:11-
12) notes the multiple uses of “responsibility” inside and outside of law. In civil law, 
for example, “responsibility is defined by the obligation to make up or to compensate 
for the tort one has caused through one’s own fault” while in penal law responsibility 
is “the obligation to accept punishment”. Outside of the legal sphere you are both 
“responsible for the consequences of your acts” and also for those of others “to the 
extent that they were done under your charge or care”. I find it difficult to locate any 
of these three uses of the term in the case of patient death in face transplantation. This 
is an outcome of (a) the underlying logics that mediate many forms of experimental 
biomedicine – “quality of life”, bioethics, norms of health and the body – which allow 
for (b) the decoupling of imputation and accountability. These logics are embedded in 
and mediate the reasoning of the bureaucratic bodies (Institutional Review Boards, 
etc.) that in approving experimental procedures plays in important part in minimizing 
questions of physician or institutional liability (Rosenburg 1999). The discursive 
making and placing of cause of death is another mode where such minimizing 
happens.  
 
The ability to attribute responsibility is itself negated in the reports discussed above 
when the actions of patients and physicians are separated from the cause of death. 
There is no discussion of who is accountable for patient death, of the possibility of 
medical negligence in the form of i.e. failure in patient selection. Nor is there talk of 
what might have been for the patients if they had not received the operation; their 
death is not presented as a tragic example of lives lost in an experimental biomedical 
realm but as exemplars of the need to select patients carefully in order to demonstrate 
the potential and safety of this form of facial reconstruction. In the epistemic 
murkiness clouding the death of Li Guoxing it was social factors that led to his non-
compliance; in the other examples it was the underlying biology of the patient – 
preexisting conditions – that caused their death, not human action. The unmaking of 
responsibility that I have written about has important parallels with the shifts brought 
about through neoliberal policies that stress individual and community empowerment. 
As Barabara Cruikshank (1999) has written, a core feature of such “empowerment” 
initiatives is that responsibility is distributed in a way that it can become difficult, 
even impossible, to attribute responsibility to any particular actor.ii In moving 
attention to the “distribution” of responsibility in technomedicine, I am suggesting 
that such difficulties exist as a central resource in the maintenance of biomedical 
projects.  
 
Moreover, sometimes responsibility disappears in the tactical work that is done to 
code medical procedures as safe and necessary, when patients die in the context of 
experimental biomedicine - responsibility is unmade by a form of speech that 
separates causes and consequences. In face transplantation, this entails aligning 
successes with the ideal patient, and vice versa, so that the cause of medical failure 
and patient death comes to lie away from the medical procedure. In his writing, 
Richard McKeon (1990:83) states: “The elements from which the concept of 
responsibility developed, accountability and imputation, are both external limits put 
on the freedom of action.” Central to this quote is the notion of human agency, as it 
pertains to the ability to act in a particular manner. Many accounts of responsibility 
and biomedicine have explored how patients’ and practitioners’ ability to act are 
mediated by a collection of social, techno-scientific, and biomedical factors (see Rose 
2007). Others have explored the transformation in patient-doctor relationship in the 
context of neoliberal biomedicine. In medical reports of patient death and face 
transplantation, agency is sidelined, it is moved outside of the field.  
 
There is of course a tension, here. Patient selection is presented as paramount to 
operative outcomes, yet in the accounts offered patient death is not caused by the 
operation itself but by a mix of technological limitations (the need for 
immunosuppressant therapy), the pre-extant wellbeing of the transplant recipient, as 
well as the social and biological environments in which they live (that contain such 
things as bacteria and “tribe doctors”). Focusing on such tensions may lead to a better 
understanding of responsibility, to one that reveals its contingency as a product of 
complex sociotechnical apparatuses, and to reflection on how we deploy the concept 
in our own analysis. Viewing responsibility in this way, as something both made and 
unmade, opens up the possibility that “responsibility” might not be present in a given 
context; it allows us to enquire into other ways that responsibility is done (or undone), 
the ramifications of this, and the reasons for its occurrence. 
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